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Reúne trabajos de investigación sobre la banca central y economía en general, con énfasis en temas y políticas relacionados con la conducción económica de los países en desarrollo.
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Browsing Series by Subject "AUTONOMÍA"
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Item '25 Años de Autonomía del Banco Central de Chile'(Banco Central de Chile, 2016) Naudon D., AlbertoItem 25 años de autonomía del Banco Central de Chile(Banco Central de Chile, 2016) Naudon D., Alberto; Álvarez V., LuisItem A 25 Años de la autonomía del Banco Central: Algunas lecciones de política(Banco Central de Chile, 2016) De Gregorio, JoséItem Algunas reflexiones sobre mi período en la Presidencia del Banco Central de Chile(Banco Central de Chile, 2016) Corbo, VittorioItem Balance de cuarenta años: objetivos funciones autonomía y responsabilidades(Banco Central de Chile, 2009) Carrasco A., Camilo, 1941-Item Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking(Banco Central de Chile, 2021-10) Pastén, Ernesto; Reis, RicardoThe three topics covered in the title of this volume have proved to be critical in the remarkable success of modern central banks around the globe in the fight to control inflation and smooth macroeconomic fluctuations. Despite these achievements, some old challenges have come back in recent years and new ones have appeared to make Independence, Credibility, and Communication of Central Banking as critical as ever—perhaps, even more so. This volume collects articles contributed by distinguished scholars to the XXIII Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, which coincided with the thirtieth anniversary of its independence. The chapters in this volume give a fresh new look to old lessons, discuss the latest developments, and provide new recommendations for central banks to meet some of their biggest challenges of the times.Item Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview(Banco Central de Chile, 2021-10) Pastén, Ernesto; Reis, RicardoThe institution of central-bank independence is often lauded as a great conquest of the accumulation of knowledge and the sensible setting of policy. The economic literature is filled with arguments for why an independent central bank would lead to better outcomes. To this prior, the experience of the last couple of decades has added the supporting data. Independent central bankers have been, for the most part, able to keep inflation under control despite shocks and macroeconomic volatility. Whether during the Global Financial Crisis, through individual country slumps, or at the trough of the pandemic recession, independent central banks were typically part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Attacks on the independence of a central bank nowadays typically generate a strong pushback from the press and civil society.Item La independencia del Banco Central de Chile: los años iniciales(Banco Central de Chile, 2016) Bianchi, AndrésItem Presentación realizada en la Conferencia sobre los 25 años de autonomía del Banco Central de Chile(Banco Central de Chile, 2016) Massad, Carlos, 1932-Item Presentación realizada en la Conferencia sobre los 25 años de autonomía del Banco Central de Chile(Banco Central de Chile, 2016) Zahler, RobertoItem Risks to central-bank independence(Banco Central de Chile, 2021-10) Rogoff, Kenneth S.Central banking today faces a number of existential challenges. On the political side, and particularly after the financial crisis, the public has come to expect central banks to take on a dizzying array of responsibilities, some far beyond their power or remit. These include everything from enhanced financial regulation to quasi-fiscal policy to mitigating economic inequality. Some recent populist proposals appear to be based on the presumption that central banks can issue large quantities of bank reserves indefinitely without any long-term inflationary or tax consequences. On the technocratic side, many central banks struggle with the trend decline in global real interest rates that steepened notably in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This decline has, in many cases, left the monetary authorities with little space to cut policy interest rates in the event of steep recession, much less in a financial crisis, and trying to put the best public face possible on much weaker “alternative monetary instruments,” such as quantitative easing (QE). At the same time, the fact that many “alternative monetary instruments” are in fact forms of fiscal policy—that could be implemented just as well or even better by finance ministries—has made the challenge of preserving centralbank independence against strong political headwinds even harder.