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http://bcentral7.opengeek.cl/handle/20.500.12580/17
Reúne trabajos de investigación sobre la banca central y economía en general, con énfasis en temas y políticas relacionados con la conducción económica de los países en desarrollo.

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Browsing Series by Subject "COMUNICACIÓN"

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    Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race
    (Banco Central de Chile, 2021-10) Cecchetti, Stephen G.; Schoenholtz, Kermit L.
    The job of central bankers is to use the monetary powers granted to them to promote price stability, sustainable growth, and a stable financial system. They do this in an environment fraught with unavoidable uncertainties. But, in conducting policy, there is one uncertainty that policymakers can and should reduce: the uncertainty they themselves create. Everyone agrees that monetary policymakers should do their best to minimize the noise that their actions add to the environment. When policy is transparent and effective, people in the economy and financial markets respond to the data, not to the policymakers. During the past quarter-century, the evolution of an ever more detailed inflation-targeting framework facilitated a vast improvement in Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) communication. Over the same period, both the level and uncertainty of inflation have declined. We infer that since the mid-1990s, the U.S. economy has been reaping the benefits of a credible commitment to price stability, including a communications framework that reinforces that commitment.
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    Central banking with many voices: the communications arms race
    (Banco Central de Chile, 2021-10) Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette
    Around the world, most central banks set policy by committee. This is motivated in part by the idea that groups reach better decisions than individuals and in part by a desire for representation of different geographical areas and economic constituencies in policymaking. The Bank for International Settlements (2009) documents that across central banks, the median number of members on monetary policy boards is eight. The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) have substantially more decision-makers than the median, with 19 members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) (of which 12 vote at any given time) and 25 members of the ECB’s Governing Council (of which 21 vote at any given time).
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    Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking
    (Banco Central de Chile, 2021-10) Pastén, Ernesto; Reis, Ricardo
    The three topics covered in the title of this volume have proved to be critical in the remarkable success of modern central banks around the globe in the fight to control inflation and smooth macroeconomic fluctuations. Despite these achievements, some old challenges have come back in recent years and new ones have appeared to make Independence, Credibility, and Communication of Central Banking as critical as ever—perhaps, even more so. This volume collects articles contributed by distinguished scholars to the XXIII Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, which coincided with the thirtieth anniversary of its independence. The chapters in this volume give a fresh new look to old lessons, discuss the latest developments, and provide new recommendations for central banks to meet some of their biggest challenges of the times.
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    Independence, credibility, and communication of central banking: an overview
    (Banco Central de Chile, 2021-10) Pastén, Ernesto; Reis, Ricardo
    The institution of central-bank independence is often lauded as a great conquest of the accumulation of knowledge and the sensible setting of policy. The economic literature is filled with arguments for why an independent central bank would lead to better outcomes. To this prior, the experience of the last couple of decades has added the supporting data. Independent central bankers have been, for the most part, able to keep inflation under control despite shocks and macroeconomic volatility. Whether during the Global Financial Crisis, through individual country slumps, or at the trough of the pandemic recession, independent central banks were typically part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Attacks on the independence of a central bank nowadays typically generate a strong pushback from the press and civil society.
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    The three E’s of central-bank communication with the public
    (Banco Central de Chile, 2021-10) Haldane, Andrew; Macaulay, Alistair; McMahon, Michael
    Central banks used to ask, “Shall we communicate this?” Now, as a rule, they ask, “Why wouldn’t we communicate this?” This first wave of the revolution in central-bank communication is giving rise to a second wave. The question increasingly is, “How should we communicate this in a way that engages a broader cross-section of society?” This addresses the challenge laid out by Blinder and others (2008) that “It may be time to pay some attention to communication with the general public.”